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In this paper, I develop a new semantic criterion 
for evaluating universal quantifi cations based on 
problems of self-reference, and use it to evaluate 
theories in Metaphysics, Philosophy of Logic, 
Philosophy of Language, Cultural Criticism, 
Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Action 
Th eory, Ethics, and Philosophy of Science, arriving 
at signifi cant results in each case.  Th e criterion is 
that universally quantifi ed sentences cannot convey 
any substantive information about the nature of 
meanings qua meanings, as that would involve 
them in circularities or something akin to self-
contradictions.  I illustrate this point by showing 
how examples of such sentences are circular or 
self-undermining.  I close with some general 
considerations of the appeal of such claims.  
Keywords: semantics, proposition, propositional 
attitude, intrinsic, extrinsic, methodology
It is sometimes said that all generalizations 
are false. I want to suggest that, while this 
isn’t strictly true, many do have something 
wrong with them, having to do with the 
fact that, if a generalization is general 
enough, it will say something about itself, 
and self-reference, as is well known, causes 
problems. Although I shall make use of 
formal devices where I can for clarity, I 
shall be posing and explaining the problem 
largely in natural language, but I hope that 
will not lead you to think that it’s not a real 
logical problem. Real semantic diffi  culties 
can be recognized without the innovations 
of a Tarski or a Russell. Some semantic 
words, such as ‘true’ and ‘false’, are as old 
as written language. Even ‘meaning’ was 
used with a sense recognizable to modern 
philosophers for centuries before they 
adopted it. Th e Liar’s Paradox was fi rst 
promulgated twenty-six centuries ago, and 
was immediately recognized as a problem. 
Tarski bases his T-conventions on the 
work of Aristotle (Tarski 1944, 342-3) 
and Hartry Field fi nds fault with modern, 
formal approaches to truth on the grounds 
that they can’t deal with problems posed 
in natural language (Field, passim.) It 
would be desirable to have a formal system 
capable of making the points I want to 
make, but it’s not necessary. 
   
I shall begin by laying out the problematic 
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sorts of sentences, and explaining them, in order to motivate my criterion for 
unacceptable generalizations. I shall then propose and explain my criterion, i.e., 
(M) All synthetic generalizations that predicate intrinsic properties of 
all propositions are semantically fl awed. 
After that, I shall explain, and give example of, how this criterion applies to theses 
in metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of culture, philosophy of mind, 
epistemology, ethics, and other areas, to show its reach and importance. I shall not 
always aim at giving the most accurate or strongest account I can of the views I attack, 
since I’m aiming at showing how a certain line of attack on them can be made to work, 
and for that purpose, oversimplifi cation can be valuable, and the general strategy for 
dealing with more complicated cases, will, I hope, be clear from the way I approach 
simple ones. I shall close by considering one possible sort of response that could be 
made to it, and saying a little more about why it’s important. 
Let ‘F’ be a predicate and p be a proposition. If ‘Fx’ is true of p in circumstance c just 
in case p is true in circumstance c, or ‘Fx’ is true of p in circumstance c just in case 
p is false in circumstance c, and in no other cases, I want to call ‘F’ a metasemantic 
predicate of p in circumstance c, and the property ‘F’ refers to a metasemantic property 
of p in circumstance c. Th e paradigm metasemantic predicates are ‘is true’ and ‘is false’. 
Now consider the following sentence. 
(1) Every sentence in this article is true. 
If I were to use (as opposed to mention) this sentence in an article, what would its truth-
value be? If one of the other sentences in the article were untrue, then straightforwardly 
untrue. But suppose I were so blessed as to write an article that consisted only of true 
sentences apart from (1)? Th e truth-value of this sentence would depend on itself, so 
that it could be determined to be true only if it were true and false only if it were false. 
Similar things can be said about: 
(2) Every sentence in this article is false. 
Only there the dependency would be inverted. 
Although ‘is true’ and ‘is false’ are the clearest cases of metasemantic predicates, they 
are not the only ones. On uncontroversial assumptions, predicates whose application 
to a proposition depends on the total truth conditions of said proposition work like 
‘is true’ and ‘is false’ in similar circumstances. If you have ‘(x)Fx’ and ‘Fx’ is true of 
p or not depending on what the truth conditions of p are, and ‘Fx’ applies to all 
propositions possibly excepting ‘(x)Fx’, then to know whether it were true or false in 
those conditions you’d have to know what it’s truth conditions were. But you couldn’t 
know what its truth conditions were until you knew whether the sentence were true or 
false in those conditions, so the problem would be insoluble. Whether it were true or 
false would depend on what its truth conditions were, and what its truth conditions 
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were would depend on whether it were true or false, so its truth-value would depend 
on its truth-value. Likewise for a predicate ‘Fx’ that applies to sentences based on 
how the references of their component parts contribute to the determination of the 
reference of the whole (the truth-value.) If you have ‘(x)Fx’, and ‘Fx’ is true of all 
other sentences, then, to know whether the universal quantifi cation were true or false, 
you’d have to know whether ‘Fx’ were true of it, and to know that, you’d have to 
know how its component parts contributed to the determination of its own truth-
value, and, hence, whether it were true or false, a vicious circle. Again, its truth-value 
would depend on its truth-value. And likewise for any ‘Fx’ which is true of p or not 
based on how it determines truth-values. If you had a predicate ‘Fx’ which was true of 
propositions which determined truth-values in some particular ways and not others, 
and it were true of all other relevant propositions, and you universally quantifi ed 
into it, then, to know whether ‘(x)Fx’ were true or false, you’d have to know how its 
proposition determined its truth-value, but that means you’d have to know whether it 
were true or false, since those alternatives exhaust the two general ways that it could 
determine its truth-value, and, again, you’d be caught in a vicious circle. Its truth-value 
would depend on what proposition it expressed, but, granted that it’s of the nature of 
propositions to determine specifi c truth-values, that would depend on its truth-value, 
so, again, its truth-value would depend on its truth-value. 
 
All the above properties are intrinsic, that is, they belong to propositions in virtue of 
what they are in themselves, not in virtue of their relations to other things (the latter sort 
are called ‘extrinsic’, or, sometimes, ‘relational’.) Th ere may be other intrinsic properties 
that propositions have; they may turn out to be ordered tuples for example. If so, the 
sentences attributing those intrinsic properties to propositions are plausibly analytic 
(at least I can’t think of any that wouldn’t be.) So, plausibly, all true sentences that 
attribute intrinsic properties to all propositions are analytic. (On the other hand, such 
properties as who expressed a proposition, when, where, and in what possible world, 
are extrinsic. It is the function of a proposition to relate utterances [by given people and 
at given places, times, and possible worlds] to truth values, and it does so by relating 
those people, places, times, and possible worlds to itself, so the properties mentioned 
in the previous sentence are relational, or extrinsic, properties of propositions, since 
propositions have them in virtue of being related to other things.) From the claim that 
all true sentences that attribute intrinsic properties to all propositions are analytic, 
it follows that all synthetic generalizations that predicate intrinsic properties of all 
propositions, cannot be straightforwardly true. As for the exception I make for analytic 
truths, I can do that because in such cases there aren’t two alternative ways in which 
the truth value could be determined by the proposition, and, hence, no unwholesome 
dependency of the way it’s determined on itself. If someone were to say “All bachelors 
are unmarried,” or “All propositions about bachelors are necessarily propositions about 
unmarried people,” we wouldn’t have to worry about whether or not the predicates 
applied to themselves or not, because that they might not is not a genuine alternative. 
Th ere is no possibility of the actual meanings of ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried’ being such 
that the meanings of the above mentioned sentences might be unmarried bachelors or 
propositions about bachelors that aren’t propositions about unmarried people. Th at is 
what it is for something to be analytically true—the meaning is such that it can’t be 
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otherwise. It follows that the only universally quantifi ed sentences without restricted 
domains that can be true are the ones that don’t tell us anything synthetic about the 
nature of meanings. Among acceptable universal statements I include, as analytic, ones 
about the nature of meaning, such as ‘All meanings mediate between lexical items and 
referents.’ In addition, logicians’ claims about the semantics of universal quantifi cations 
would have to be analytic to be true, since these are themselves universal quantifi cations. 
I would count my principal claims about what happens when universally quantifying 
into a metasemantic predicate as true because analytic as well, because they follow 
directly from plausibly logical claims about the semantics of universal quantifi cations. 
 
It follows from these considerations immediately, that all existential statements with 
metasemantic predicates and unrestricted domains are true or analytically false, if not 
merely problematic. 
It might help to consider another sentence somewhat removed from (1) and (2) to 
see how sentences not obviously circular or self-contradictory might still be fl awed. 
Consider this: 
(3) It is unreasonable to believe any sentence in this paper, 
written in a paper in which no other sentence is reasonable to believe. It might seem 
that this would not lead to paradox, because sentences which aren’t reasonable to 
believe can be true nonetheless. However, if it’s reasonable to believe it, it’s reasonable 
to believe that it’s not reasonable to believe it, so it would seem that it’s not reasonable 
to believe it. On the other hand, if it’s not reasonable to believe it, it would seem to be 
true, and its obvious truth should count as a reason to believe it. So, it’s reasonable to 
believe it if and only if it’s not reasonable to believe it. Th ere might not be an outright 
semantic paradox, but there’s what might be called and epistemological paradox, a 
paradox in justifi cation. Its fl aws can also be brought out by considering that, if it’s 
reasonable to believe it, then it should be rejected on the basis that it says it isn’t, and 
if it’s not reasonable to believe it, it should be rejected on that basis, so, one way or 
another, it should be rejected. 
   
We shall call sentences such as I’ve stipulated (1), (2) and (3) to be “semantically 
problematic” (or “problematic” for short,) and say they are not straightforwardly true 
and not straightforwardly false. I intend this terminology to be neutral among the 
diff erent theories of such sentences, and don’t want to take a stand on whether they’re 
true, or false, or both, or neither. Having said that, I shall henceforward abbreviate 
“not straightforwardly true” as “untrue”, and “not straightforwardly false” as “unfalse.” 
Th is goes against the plain English meaning of the words, but shall simplify the rest of 
the paper. 
 
Th ese considerations, moreover, in addition to giving us a new and powerful rule 
whereby we can evaluate theories, suggest a further way in which we can verify the 
verdicts given by the rule. All the views condemned by this criterion, according to what 
we’ve developed so far, have problems of circularity or self-contradiction in regard to 
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how they apply to themselves. If we examine examples in the concrete, I submit that 
we’re likely to fi nd circularities or tendencies to undermine themselves in all the cases 
that fail our test. I shall try to expose such failings as I consider the consequences of our 
criterion in the remainder of this paper, and I think the ability to do so should further 
confi rm the basic principle that suggests them. As I said before, I shall not aim at 
historical accuracy, or at refuting the strongest form of a theory, but at illustrating how 
the criterion works. I hope that, once that’s clear, it can be applied in more diffi  cult, or 
complicated, cases.
First, let’s consider an extreme Idealism, holding that everything is dependent on minds, 
including meanings. Th is would seem to be a synthetic universal statement, banned by 
our criterion. Does it fall prey to problems when applied to itself? Well, if everything is 
dependent on minds, then the fact that everything is dependent on minds is dependent 
on minds, so, if the relevant minds came to think diff erently, there might be no such 
fact. And, if it weren’t a fact that everything was dependent on minds, something 
wouldn’t be dependent on any minds. So something could exist independently of any 
mind. Presumably, Idealists would resist such a consequence. Physicalism, on the other 
hands, claims that everything real, including propositions, can be reduced to physics. 
But, consider the sentence “Everything can be reduced to physics.” Th e laws of physics 
can’t be the full story on what makes a proposition satisfy ‘x can be reduced to physics’ 
as that would make the laws of physics circular, so Physicalism can’t account for it’s 
formulation, and, taken to its logical extreme, can’t be true, either. 
We can have sentences such as ‘Nothing is both so and not,’ and other logical principles, 
be true by relying on the old distinction between form and content, and holding that 
laws of logic tell us nothing about the content of the sentences they apply to. I’m aware 
that this distinction is in disrepute in some circles nowadays, but I think the above 
considerations can both motivate and help to explain it. We can also see that a sentence 
such as
  (4) Logic is merely a tool of oppression 
can’t be true. After all, if it were, it would have to predicate an intrinsic property of 
logic, for logical principles, to be oppressive, would presumably have to favor some 
propositions (the “oppressive” ones) over others (the “liberating” ones,) presumably 
by predicating an intrinsic property (either being oppressive or being liberating) of 
every sentence, including (4). So, in order to know whether the predicate ‘x is a tool of 
oppression’ applied to logic one would have to know how logic classed all propositions, 
and in order to know how logic classed all propositions, one would have to know 
how logic applied to (4), and the meanings of the laws of logic and (4) would depend 
on each other in a vicious circle. We can see how the sentence undermines itself by 
considering how it could be justifi ed. If it can be supported by logical argument, then 
it condemns itself. If it can not, then it is condemned on that ground. 
It might be objected that the above argument would not be convincing to the 
misologue since it presupposes logic, which he undertakes to reject. I deny that it 
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presupposes logic. It is possible to employ logic, I maintain, without presupposing it. 
In standard natural deduction systems, one routinely employs inference rules before 
one has proven any logical truths by means of them, and it is possible to know how 
to reason logically even if one has mistaken beliefs about logic, just as it’s possible to 
know how to ride a bicycle even if one has very mistaken beliefs about bicycle-riding. 
I think Hume did the former. It’s true that a determined misologue could just deny 
my distinction between presupposing and employing logic, and remain a misologue. I 
think my argument is valuable anyway because it gives reasonable people more insight 
into where the misologue goes wrong. In addition to this theoretical value, I also think 
it is of some small dialectical use. Although it’s true, for better or worse, that there’s 
no infallible way of keeping a suitably determined man from being an ass, this may 
infl uence some of the less determined ones, and might well force the most determined 
one to work harder to misunderstand the issues, making him more confused and less 
considerable of an opponent in the future. All of these are good results. 
Th e considerations I’ve been developing here have consequences for other sorts of 
philosophy than metaphysical monisms and misologies. So far, we’ve mostly considered 
universal quantifi cations of atomic formulae, but other sorts of universal statements fail 
in the same way, provided their truth depends on the nature of their own semantics. 
Consider theories of meaning, which can be regarded as having the form: 
(5) For all x, x is a meaning just in case x is S. 
Th ese are all suspect as long as they can be used to rule out some things as meanings. 
Often they have been so used, which is doubtless one of the motivations for coming 
up with them. Th e dictum that all meaning is utterly indeterminate, which I believe 
Deconstructionists have held, would seem to be problematic. If that is so, then the 
sentence “Meaning is utterly indeterminate” might mean that meaning is not utterly 
indeterminate, and I presume that whatever protagonists it might have would balk at 
that interpretation. And there are liable to be problems facing theories that don’t aim 
to characterize all meanings, but only some, as well. Consider the following: 
(6) All talk about how much one cares about others is nothing but a 
cover for selfi shness. 
Th is says of every sentence that either it is not about how much one cares about others, 
or it is, by virtue of its meaning, a cover for selfi shness. Th is seems to be a disjunction 
of two metasemantic predicates, attributing at least one of them to each sentence, and, 
hence, must be false or meaningless. To see this more clearly, consider that talk about 
talk about how much one cares about others would seem, indirectly, to be talk about 
how much one cares about others, since there is a close connection between meanings 
and the things they pick out, and talking about one tells one something about the 
other. Indeed, such sentences are often put forward to tell us, not just something about 
caring talk, but something about caring itself. Th us, the sentence says of itself that it’s 
nothing but a cover for selfi shness, reason enough to disregard it. Looking at it another 
way, if the sentence is right about all other talk, the question remains whether it’s 
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reasonable to believe it or not. If it is, it shouldn’t be believed, because it’s just a cover 
for selfi shness. If it’s not, it’s credible, since it warns others not to be fooled. So the 
sentence should be believed if and only if it shouldn’t, a contradiction. 
Th e only semantic theories, local or global, that could be correct would be ones that 
don’t set limits on what can be meaningful, and center on the relation between language 
and the world, the latter requirement being plausibly analytic. (Note that I do not 
claim that this means that no talk about how much one cares about others is a cover for 
selfi shness, still less that talk about how much one cares about others can’t be a cover 
for selfi shness. On the contrary, such sweeping generalizations would have to be false 
or meaningless as well as (6).)  
Talk about discourses and texts is standardly talk about sentences and their meaning. 
Th us, the postmodernist claim that all discourses are informed by power relations 
would have to be untrue. It occurs in a discourse, and, so, by its own account would 
have to be informed by power relations. Th is is ordinarily thought to rule out the 
possibility of rationality or objectivity. So, it would be at least as suspect as views it’s 
used to condemn, perhaps more, because it condemns itself, something that the others 
rarely do. Consider also, the case in which it’s true of all other discourses. Th en, if 
it’s reasonable to believe it, it’s not reasonable to believe it, because it proclaims its 
unreliability, and, if it’s not reasonable to believe it, it is, because it warns you that it’s 
not. It’s true that the determined postmodernist might choose not to be persuaded 
by these considerations, but this gives us an additional reason not to take his choices 
seriously, if we need one, by giving us greater insight to his views, and can be of use in 
persuading those on the fence. 
Since literature and philosophy and all other theorizing falls under the rubric of 
“culture”, much theorizing about culture will be disapproved by this account. Th e 
Marxist claim that all culture is a result of economic forces and the Nazi claim that 
culture is a product of the race will both have to be rejected. Each of them says of 
itself that it has no particular claim to objectivity. If it’s right about itself, it shouldn’t 
be believed for that reason; if it’s wrong, it shouldn’t be believed because it’s false. 
Likewise, if either is right about all other forms of culture, it will follow that it should 
be believed just in case it shouldn’t, by an argument which must be familiar by now. 
Whatever account of culture we ultimately settle on, if correct, will have to allow any 
semantic kind of theory at all to be entertained by the culture that arrives at it. 
Since theories of truth purport to be true, they can be considered under the same light 
we have been considering other theories under. If a theory of truth makes truth merely 
a property of sentences’ meanings, rather than a matter of their relations to the world, 
then it fails along the lines sketched above. As for coherence theories of truth, either 
the criterion of maximal coherence favors no sentences above others, in which case 
it has the obvious problem that it can’t distinguish between true and false sentences, 
or else it does, in which case the proposed defi nition must be false or meaningless 
as I have argued. If it favors itself, its justifi cation will be circular, if it doesn’t, it will 
undermine itself. Only the correspondence theory of truth evades the above problems, 
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in that it makes truth not a matter of the metasemantic properties of a sentence, but 
of its relation to the facts. Th is defi nition of truth doesn’t discriminate among diff erent 
sentences on account of their properties, but doesn’t allow for pluralism either. What 
makes a sentence true is not just its meaning, but the facts; the facts determine truth; 
the defi nition treats all sentences equally. Th is argument might well not persuade 
doubters to adopt the correspondence theory. After all, it’s based on an account of 
a metasemantic property that might be regarded as presupposing much of it. Still, I 
think it’s worth mentioning, as giving better insight into how the others fail than we 
might have been able to attain without it. 
So far I’ve mostly been working with a very thin notion of a proposition; all that I 
required of one, for the most part, was that it determine a truth value together with 
the facts. Granted that sentences have truth values that have something to do with the 
facts, it’s hard to see how there could be nothing which determines them, and I think 
even people who might resist a robust notion of propositions or meanings can accept 
my reasoning to this point without ontological qualms. We can get further important 
results, however, if we add to this thin notion that propositions are the objects of 
propositional attitudes. If we do this, then often we can regard properties of propositional 
attitudes as properties of propositions. Th us many theories of intentionality and mental 
content can be judged by the standard we have developed. Consider the dictum that 
all conscious mental states, and their contents, are merely the surface manifestations 
of subconscious drives. We are conscious of thinking about it, so it must be false or 
problematic. After all, if it is a surface manifestation of subconscious drives, that in 
itself would commonly be thought to rule out rationality and objectivity, so it should 
be rejected, and it it’s not, it’s false and, so, should be rejected. Consider also, that, if it’s 
true about all other propositional attitudes, then the speculation that it’s so should be 
believed precisely if it’s not trustworthy. Th e same thing can be said about many more 
specifi c attempts to reduce propositional attitudes. Consider: ‘Mathematics is merely 
a sublimation of the sex drive.’ Th is can be regarded as claiming of all propositional 
attitudes that either they’re not about Math, or else they are about sex, which fails along 
the lines of sentence (6) above. Th is seems to say something about Math, and so, says 
of itself that it’s merely a sublimation of the sex drive. If it is, we can’t expect the desire 
to make the two-backed beast to result in reliable information about Mathematics, so 
we have no reason to believe the sentence in question, and if it’s not, it’s false. If it’s 
true about all other mathematical reasoning, it has the consequence, once again, that 
it’s rationally credible just in case it isn’t. Attempted reductions of one propositional 
attitude to another fail, and Bishop Butler’s comment, “Everything is what it is and 
not another thing,” originally posed to controvert those who would try to reduce other 
mental states to self-love, is vindicated (Butler 1983, 20) 
In fact, the account we have developed places severe constraints on attempts to discover 
a general account of how the human mind works. If one makes the assumptions that 
the content of mental states aff ects behavior, and that the way it aff ects it can only be 
known a posteriori and, hence, isn’t analytic, he can soon come to the conclusion that 
such a general account must be inconceivable to human beings. Such an account, if 
complete, would have to contain an account of the eff ect which conceiving it would 
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have upon behavior, but, since that would depend upon its content, that couldn’t be 
conceived until one had conceived the whole theory, since it would depend on the 
content of the theory. Th us, one couldn’t conceive of the whole of the theory until he 
had conceived of the part, and one couldn’t conceive of the part until he had conceived 
of the whole, so conception of the theory would be impossible. What’s more, the 
inconceivability of the theory couldn’t be due to its subject matter. To see this, consider 
the supposition that there’s a being who can understand everything. If so, and if what 
people could conceive of were limited by subject matter, then a correct theory of the 
human mind would have to say what sort of subject matter it couldn’t conceive of, by 
a metasemantic predicate. Th is predicate, in turn, could not be understood unless and 
until one understood what sorts of contents it applied to. But that would mean one 
couldn’t understand the content of the theory without understanding the predicate, 
and one couldn’t understand the predicate without understanding whether it applied to 
the theory, understanding which would, in turn depend on understanding the content 
of the theory.  So the being that could understand everything couldn’t understand the 
theory until he’d already understood it, which is impossible. But something which 
can’t be understood by a being that can understand everything can’t exist, so there can 
be no such theory. A theory of the human mind that was inconceivable to humans 
would have to be inconceivable due to its structure, or complexity, or something other 
than its subject matter. Th e only accounts of the roles of propositional attitudes in our 
mental economy that we can conceive of would have to be in terms of their logical 
or analytic properties, or their relations to reality. Likewise, theories of what selves 
are or should be fall under suspicion to the extent that they have implications for 
what propositional attitudes selves can and do hold. Th us, the claim that subjectivities 
are constituted by institutions would seem to fail. It says of itself that it came from 
subjectivity constituted by institutions, and we can’t expect such a subjectivity to get 
things right. If it did, the claim is suspect, if it didn’t, the claim is false.  
We can draw conclusions about particular kinds of propositional attitudes, too. 
One of the most important propositional attitudes, philosophically, is knowledge, 
and we might expect to get interesting results applying our methods to the fi eld of 
Epistemology. Th e view that knowledge proceeds from some sort of causal connection 
between the knower and what is known would seem to rule out knowledge of certain 
propositions, knowledge of mathematics for example, and, so, would stand condemned 
on our account. Moreover, knowledge of the proposition that knowledge is due to a 
causal connection between the knower and the known would seem to be possible, 
on this account, only on the basis of a causal connection with knowledge in general. 
Th is would include knowledge of that proposition, so knowledge of the causal theory 
would seem to have to have caused itself. (None of this would rule out some role for 
causality in the formation of knowledge, or prevent it from explaining it in some cases. 
In fact, the criterion I use would guarantee that it must have some role in some cases, 
since that is the negation of the right sort of generalization. All that would be ruled out 
is the claim that it’s the whole story in all cases, which there’s other reason to doubt.) 
More generally, the only accounts that would pass muster would be ones that analyzed 
justifi cation in terms of the properties that can apply generally to propositions, the 
proof-theoretic ones or truth. Some sort of reliabilist account seems our best bet. 
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Actions involve propositions in two ways. First, they are often held to be the results of 
propositional attitudes (belief and desire are the most commonly mentioned); second, 
they can be regarded as bringing about states of aff airs expressible by propositions. 
From either perspective, properties of actions can be metasemantic properties of 
propositions. Th ey can be applied to Ethical theories. Utilitarianism is an example of 
a theory that would fail such a test, making the right action one that had the property 
of maximizing happiness. It would follow that one shouldn’t obey Utilitarian ethics if 
acceptance of the theory didn’t maximize happiness. I think this is a real possibility. 
Many people fi nd the Utilitarian view of the world profoundly repellent, as Utilitarians 
themselves have noticed, and it may well be that general acceptance of it would not 
maximize happiness. Even if it did, this would, nonetheless, seem to be a contingent 
fact about human nature. We could have been so constituted as to become hopelessly 
demoralized by acceptance of Utilitarianism, in which case, our Utilitarian duty would 
have been to reject it, surely an embarrassment for that view. It would seem that, if we 
are to come to an adequate account of what actions are right and what wrong, it will 
have to be based on the form of the rules we follow, rather than on their content, or 
perhaps on their relations to the facts. 
Philosophy of Science might be regarded as being subject to some of the constraints 
we’ve developed, inasmuch as it can be regarded as giving an account of the propositions 
that make up the scientifi c corpus of knowledge. Consider a sentence such as: 
(7) All science is informed by contextual values. 
It might be unclear initially whether this sentence says anything about itself, since it 
might be unclear whether there are metasemantic criteria associated with what makes 
something scientifi c. If there are, then it’s a universal quantifi cation into a metasemantic 
matrix, but what if there aren’t? I think we can show that (7) is in trouble when we 
refl ect that it is supposed to express a necessary truth. It’s not supposed to be merely 
a coincidence that science is informed by contextual values, but due to the nature of 
how science has been done. If there are no metasemantic criteria for what constitutes 
science, then any proposition could be part of science under the right circumstances, 
so the one expressed by the above sentence could. Th at would render the sentence, 
minus the implicit necessity operator, untrue in the possible worlds in which it is part 
of science, in turn rendering the sentence, with the necessity operator, untrue in our 
world, since, if a sentence prefaced by necessity operator is untrue in any world, the 
sentence formed by prefacing said sentence with the necessity operator is untrue in ours, 
by a plausible extension of modal semantics. Th us, the sentence is untrue whether or 
not ‘is science’ is a metasemantic predicate. Consider that, if any subject matter can be 
part of science, then (7) can, and, if it were, and it were right about all other sentences, 
then it would, once again be rationally credible precisely if it weren’t, a contradiction. 
Th e only predicates that can hold necessarily of the whole of Science would have to be 
non-metasemantic ones, presumably ones that characterize it in terms of justifi cation. 
It follows by parity of reasoning that all universal statements about what propositions 
must necessarily be like fail even if they only have partly metasemantic matrices, and 
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the only necessary properties that propositions have are analytic or logical ones. From 
this it follows that all statements of propositions’ potentialities are unfalse, except those 
that say they can violate logical or analytic rules. 
Before closing, I’d like to discuss two more, general, points. First, the semantic principle 
I’ve been discussing is liable to some counter-moves. A frequent response to a claim 
that a theory undermines itself is to give a non-cognitivist account of the sentences 
that make up the theory, that is, to deny that their purpose is to describe the world. 
For example, the ancient Pyrrhonian Skeptics, in response to the question of how 
they knew that nothing could be known, denied that they knew it, and claimed just 
that it was a useful tool for acquiring ataraxia, which can very loosely be translated 
‘peace of mind.’ Similar moves are probably available to the proponents of many of the 
views mentioned above. I think my approach is worthy of attention anyway, because, 
fi rst, the result that views of this kind can’t be understood as assertions is itself an 
important one, and second, the claim that their proponents aren’t committed to them 
as assertions is often itself open to challenge. In the case of the Pyrrhonians, it’s hard 
to see why you’d think resting in ignorance would lead to peace of mind better than 
discovering knowledge would, unless you knew that knowledge were unattainable; 
the arguments that Pyrrhonians used to attain suspension of judgment often weren’t 
convincing to those who didn’t already believe that knowledge was unattainable (the 
Stoics, in particular, didn’t accept many of them); and, even if the method had worked 
in the past, without knowledge of the skeptical claim there was no reason to believe 
it would work in the future, and hence no reason to continue to be a Pyrrhonian. 
Pyrrhonian practice contravened Pyrrhonian protestations. 
Second, a mental review of the views our criterion would rule out suggests to me that 
many of them are not views taken seriously in Anglo-American philosophy anyway, 
and even a review of the views I’ve discussed might suggest it. I submit that that doesn’t 
make my results about them devoid of all interest. For one thing, the fact that my 
criterion gives the result that many views we hold to be fl awed are fl awed is a reason 
to accept it. We want a test that agrees with our best judgment in large part; what 
would we do if it contradicted it? For another thing, even though these sorts of views, 
including totalitarian ones, may not command respect in our circles, it’s a known fact 
that they do command, or have commanded, respect in many others. Why and how 
they do this are legitimate questions which have philosophical dimensions. After all, 
if you accept that human beings are rational, as many of us do, and that they desire 
the good, as is the common opinion in Moral Psychology, it then becomes diffi  cult to 
explain why they’d accept so many views that seem to be deliberate aff ronts to reason 
and goodness. My account can throw light on these facts. Th e universal statements I 
discuss are prone to becoming meaningless due to circularity in how their meanings 
are determined. Th is circularity in the determination of meanings can be disguised by 
a parallel circularity in argument, using the universal sentences to support themselves, 
and the circularity in the former would naturally suggest to those who grasp them 
dimly the circular argument. Th us, these theories have a built in (bad) argument ready 
at hand to support them. Moreover, some of these views have resulted in very great 
harm being done (especially Marxism and Nazi Race Th eory,) and if I can either help 
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to discredit them or further our understanding of them to guard against such harms 
in the future, it would be a good thing, and, while such merely practical concerns 
should not be the primary consideration for a philosopher, I hold that, if they can be 
pursued without compromising our work of theoretical understanding, we have some 
obligation to do so. 
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